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1. – The law of contract has long been criticised for lagging behind in
its solutions for the use of electronic communications in commerce, lead-
ing to uncertainty which in turn creates obstacles to trade (1). The entry
into force of the United Nations Convention of 23 November 2005 on the
Use of Electronic Communications in International Contracts (hereinaf-
ter: UN Electronic Communications Convention) in March 2013 was
therefore heralded as an important step forward, as it removes some of the
legal risks inherent in electronic commerce (2).
One issue that has received little attention so far in this context is mo-
(1) S. Eiselen, The Purpose, Scope and Underlying Principles of the UNECIC, in C.B.
Andersen & U.G. Schroeter (eds.), Sharing International Commercial Law across National
Boundaries: Festschrift for Albert H. Kritzer on the Occasion of his Eightieth Birthday, London,
2008, p. 106.
(2) H.D. Gabriel, The United Nations Convention on the Use of Electronic Communica-
tion in International Contracts: an Overview and Analysis, in Uniform Law Review, 2006, p. 286.
bile communication, i.e. the fact that messages transmitted via phone,
e-mail, SMS or some other means of communication can today be dis-
patched and received at virtually any place on earth, using everyday techni-
cal equipment like mobile phones, smartphones, tablet computers or note-
books with access to the internet. “People have grown accustomed to being
connected to their @Internet# services all the time, whatever their device
type and wherever their location. Computers are no longer office or house-
hold devices but personal devices with a built-in mobile broadband con-
nection” (3), resulting in the new term “m-commerce” being coined for
commercial transactions conducted through wireless communication ser-
vices using small, handheld mobile devices (4).
The arrival of mobile communication has brought changes to the in-
ternational contracting practice and its participants, resulting in what could
be described as the “modern travelling merchant”. The proverbial travel-
ling merchant of the Middle Ages travelled to foreign cities and towns car-
rying goods he wanted to sell, and transporting other goods he purchased
during his travels back to his home country. The contracts of sale or pur-
chase that Medieval travelling merchants concluded were nevertheless
concluded locally (on the spot), with other merchants he met and negoti-
ated with in the cities he visited. The “modern” travelling merchant com-
bines his cross-border mobility with an ability to communicate across bor-
ders – a businessman from Cape Town attending a meeting in Milan can
today enter into a sales contract by sending an e-mail from his mobile de-
vice to a merchant in Buenos Aires. It is this combined mobility of both
persons and communications that raises novel legal questions to be ad-
dressed in this article.
1.1. – a) The Typical Scenario Envisaged by International Contract Law
Rules
When taking international contract law (understood as the rules of law
specifically designed to address international contracts, whether through
rules of substantive law or through conflict of laws rules) as a starting point,
it is surprising to see that the existing legal rules in this area are almost al-
ways based on the assumption that the parties to international contracts –
the buyers and sellers, the senders and consignees, the suppliers and factors
(3) M. Furmston & G.J. Tolhurst, Contract Formation: Law and Practice, Oxford,
2010, para. 6.06.
(4) Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), OECD
Policy Guidance for Addressing Emerging Consumer Protection and Empowerment Issues in Mo-
bile Commerce, OECD Ministerial Meeting on the Future of the Internet Economy, Seoul,
Korea, 17-18 June 2008, p. 2.
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etc. – each stay in their home country throughout the formation and the ex-
ecution of the contract. The picture implicitly underlying international con-
tract law rules is thus essentially one of “immobile merchants”: What typi-
cally crosses the border under an international contract are the communica-
tions between the parties and (later, during contract performance) the goods
or services contracted for, by not the acting parties themselves.
A prominent example for this model can be found in the Hague Con-
vention of 1 July 1964 relating to a Uniform Law on the International Sale
of Goods (ULIS). During the preparation of ULIS, the appropriate tests of
the international character of a sales transaction had proven to be a “funda-
mental problem” that Professor Tunc in his official commentary described
as “very delicate” (5). Article 1(1) ULIS as finally adopted provided that:
“The present Law shall apply to contracts of sale of goods entered into by par-
ties whose places of business are in the territories of different States, in each of the
following cases:
(a) where the contract involves the sale of goods which are at the time of the
conclusion of the contract in the course of carriage or will be carried from the ter-
ritory of one State to the territory of another;
(b) where the acts constituting the offer and the acceptance have been ef-
fected in the territories of different States;
(c) where delivery of the goods is to be made in the territory of a State other
than that within whose territory the acts constituting the offer and the acceptance
have been effected”.
In the cases addressed by Article 1(1)(a) ULIS, the goods moved
across the border, while in those addressed by Article 1(1)(b) ULIS the
party declarations resulting in the contract did, but none of the constella-
tions mentioned in Article 1(1)(a)-(c) ULIS involved a contracting party
crossing the border. This did, of course, not mean that buyers and sellers
could not physically leave their home country when acting in relation to an
international sales contract, but ULIS regarded such party mobility as le-
gally irrelevant.
When the United Nations Convention of 11 April 1980 on Contracts
for the International Sale of Goods (hereinafter: UN Sales Convention)
was drafted as successor instrument to the ULIS, care was taken to restruc-
ture the sphere of applicability provisions in order to reduce their complex-
ity. The “subjective” elements contained in Article 1(1)(a)-(c) ULIS were
accordingly dropped, and only the “objective” criterion of two parties hav-
(5) A. Tunc, Commentary of the Hague Conventions of 1st July 1964 on the International
Sale of Goods and on the Formation of Contracts of Sale, Rome, 1964, p. 12.
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ing their places of business in different States was maintained in Article
1(1) UN Sales Convention. Despite these changes, the drafters’ mental fo-
cus on contracting parties that conduct their business from their office in
their respective home country remained unchanged: The few scenarios in-
volving a party acting outside its home country which were discussed dur-
ing the preparation of the UN Sales Convention – notably that of a mes-
sage being personally delivered to a party at the place of business of the
other party or at the addressee’s hotel (6), and that of a seller’s senior offi-
cials with supporting staff renting a suite of rooms for a month in the city
where the buyer has its headquarters in order to conduct the negotiations
and the final execution of a contract in that suite (7) –, were considered to
be uncommon exceptions that did not warrant a departure from the gen-
eral assumption that buyers and sellers work from their home base.
Under the UN Sales Convention, the pertinent role model therefore
continues to be that of “immobile” merchants. The same holds true for the
numerous other uniform law instruments whose sphere of applicability
has been modelled on the UN Sales Convention, as e.g. the Hague Con-
vention of 22 December 1986 on the Law Applicable to Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods (hereinafter: Hague PIL Convention of 1986),
the UNIDROIT Convention of 28 May 1988 on International Factoring or
the UNConvention of 11 December 1995 on Independent Guarantees and
Stand-by Letters of Credit (to name but a few), making this role model the
prevailing one in contemporary international contract law.
b) The Changing Reality in an Age of Mobile Communication
The arrival of modern means of “mobile” electronic communication
has put the above-mentioned role model increasingly at odds with the re-
alities of contemporary business life. Today’s merchants frequently travel
abroad in order to conduct their business, but usually continue to take care
of other transactions unrelated to the particular journey during their trav-
els. Due to the combination of cross-border mobility and the global avail-
ability of mobile means of communication, a message relating to a particu-
lar contract may therefore be dispatched from or received at a location
which is completely unrelated to the contract and to the sending or receiv-
ing party. As a result, the domestic laws which could apply to a given trans-
action effectively multiply in comparison to the traditional scenario of an
(6) UNCITRAL Secretariat, Commentary on the Draft Convention on Contracts for
the International Sale of Goods, in United Nations Conference on Contracts for the Interna-
tional Sale of Goods, Official Records, New York, 1981, p. 26.
(7) J.O. Honnold, Uniform Law for International Sales under the 1980 United Nations
Convention, 3rd ed., The Hague, 1999, p. 32.
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“immobile” merchant discussed above. This is particularly troublesome
because the mobility of today’s merchants means that many of the places
at which communication activities are conducted are merely random,
short-term locations (hotels, airports) which are impossible to recognize or
foresee for the other party: An e-mail that a contracting partner sent using
his usual e-mail account may have been dispatched anywhere in the world.
Consider the following example:
Kenji, the sales manager for a Japanese producer of technical equipment that
has its offices in Tokyo, is being contacted via e-mail by Pierre, sole owner and
manager of a medium-sized company based in Nice (France), who is interested in
purchasing a technical product. The two have never conducted business with each
other before. Kenji is presently on a business trip and therefore opens Pierre’s
e-mail (which was sent from Pierre’s e-mail account with a “.eu” top level domain
(TLD) stored on a server in Switzerland) at his hotel in Los Angeles (U.S.A.), but
only responds with a message quoting the price and conditions that he sends from
Mexico City during a lunch break. Pierre’s e-mail message in which he orders the
desired products reaches Kenji while he is changing planes at Charles de Gaulle
Airport in Paris (France). Kenji finally dispatches the corresponding acceptance
from Dubai (United Arab Emirates), which is later supplemented by a further
message sent by his office staff in Tokyo to Pierre.
This contract formation scenario, while not particularly complex from
a structural perspective, draws its complexity from the sole fact that one of
the party representatives involved is changing his location during the nego-
tiation and conclusion process, thereby creating connections to various lo-
cations in various countries. And each of these countries has its own legal
rules on contract law in general and on e-commerce in particular as well as
factual circumstances that may differ from those in other countries. Which
among these factors in fact and in law should be relevant for the contract
that has (or may not have) been concluded?
1.2. – The reason why the cross-border mobility of contracting parties
can potentially cause legal problems lies primarily in the importance that
the place of communication has traditionally had in international contract
law. During the preparation of the UN Electronic Communications Con-
vention, the responsible Working Group within the United Nations Com-
mission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) accordingly noted that
“@c#onsiderable legal uncertainty is caused at present by the difficulty of de-
termining where a party to an online transaction is located.While that dan-
ger has always existed, the global reach of electronic commerce hasmade it
more difficult than ever to determine location. This uncertainty could have
significant legal consequences, since the location of the parties is impor-
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tant for issues such as jurisdiction, applicable law and enforcement” (8).
In stressing the legal importance of the location of communicating
parties, the UNCITRAL Working Group made reference to the role of a
party’s location as what in private international law parlance is typically
called a “connecting factor”: Some conflict of laws rules look to the place
where a declaration with legal significance (an offer, and acceptance, a legal
notice of some sort) is “made” (dispatched or received) in order to deter-
mine the substantive law applicable to such a declaration, and do so by ren-
dering the domestic law in force at that place (the so-called lex loci actus)
applicable. A comparable approach is taken by private international law
rules which refer to the place where a contract is “made” in order to deter-
mine the substantive law governing the contract (the lex loci contractus). In
former times, the place of contracting was even regarded as the most sig-
nificant connecting factor for international contracts (9), and in many
countries it is still viewed as significant today.
When a contract is being negotiated and eventually concluded
through the use of mobile communications, the connection to the place(s)
of declaration and the place of contracting may seem particularly random.
The example of Pierre and Kenji given above is case in point, as Kenji’s
temporary presence in Los Angeles, Mexico City, Paris and Dubai respec-
tively lacks any strong connection to the contract concluded and eventually
performed between the seller from Tokyo and the buyer from Nice. Hand
in hand with the fleeting nature of these temporary locations goes an un-
certainty on the side of the other party (Pierre), who may or may not be
aware of changes in Kenji’s location that are occurring (10).
1.3. – In view of the “considerable legal uncertainty” about the loca-
tion of parties to commercial online transactions and the (at least assumed)
importance of that location in various legal contexts (11), there was wide
agreement within UNCITRAL as to the need for provisions that would re-
move this uncertainty. The result was inter alia Article 10(3) UNElectronic
Communications Convention, which reads:
(8) UNCITRAL Secretariat, Explanatory note on the United Nations Convention on the
Use of Electronic Communications in International Contracts, New York, 2007, para. 109.
(9) P. Hay, O. Lando & R. Rotunda, Conflict of Laws as a Technique for Legal Integra-
tion, in M. Cappelletti, M. Seccombe & J. Weiler (eds.), Integration Through Law: Europe
and the American Federal Experience. Vol. 1: Methods, Tools and Institutions. Book 2: Political
Organs, Integration Techniques and Judicial Process, Berlin & New York, 1985, p. 240.
(10) But see alsoD.J.B. Svantesson, Time for the Law to Take Internet Geolocation Tech-
nologies Seriously, in 8 J. Priv. Int’l Law, 2012, p. 473.
(11) UNCITRAL Secretariat, Explanatory note, cit., para. 109.
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“An electronic communication is deemed to be dispatched at the place where
the originator has its place of business and is deemed to be received at the place
where the addressee has its place of business, as determined in accordance with ar-
ticle 6”.
Article 10(3) UN Electronic Communications Convention tackles its
assigned task by “anchoring” the dispatch as well as the receipt of elec-
tronic communications at the place of business of the originator respec-
tively the addressee, thereby removing any legal relevance of the actual lo-
cations of dispatch or receipt. The provision in other words “relocates” the
place of communication for legal purposes. In a cross-border scenario in-
volving a travelling merchant, Article 10(3) UN Electronic Communica-
tions Convention in consequence relocates communications internation-
ally, thereby (at least potentially) shifting connecting factors across borders
and influencing the determination of the applicable law. This effect could
gain particular relevance in the context of mobile communication, as the
place of communication will quite often be located in a country other than
that of the respective party’s place of business.
a) Primary Rationale behind the Provision
Although Article 10(3) UN Electronic Communications Convention
may accordingly appear as a provision tailor-made for mobile communica-
tion, the principal reason for its adoption was a different one. (This is
hardly surprising, as the transfer of written communications from and to
mobile devices only became a common phenomenon after the UN Elec-
tronic Communications Convention had been adopted in 2005). The rai-
son d’être for its Article 10(3) was therefore another characteristic of elec-
tronic commerce that was viewed as inadequately treated under existing
law, namely, that very often the information system (the server) of the ad-
dressee where the electronic communication is received, or from which
the electronic communication is retrieved, is located in a jurisdiction other
than that in which the addressee itself is located. Thus, the rationale be-
hind the provision is to ensure that the location of an information system
(in our example used above: Pierre’s e-mail account being stored on a
server in Switzerland) is not the determinant element, and that there is
some reasonable connection between the addressee and what is deemed to
be the place of receipt and that this place can be readily ascertained by the
originator (12).
Although Article 10(3) UN Electronic Communications Convention
was accordingly not specifically geared towards mobile communication, it
(12) UNCITRAL Secretariat, Explanatory note, cit., para. 194.
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nevertheless applies to such means of communication. The thought be-
hind it is furthermore the same as the one underlying Article 6(4) of the
same convention which declares both the location of equipment and tech-
nology supporting an information system and the location where an infor-
mation system may be accessed to be unsuitable as connecting factors (13).
In doing so, the UN Electronic Communications Convention explicitly
lays down a rule that had already previously been developed under the UN
Sales Convention by way of interpretation, where the location of a server is
similarly regarded as irrelevant for establishing the “place of business” of
parties to sales contracts that have been concluded online (14).
b) Character as a Firm Rule
When considering the effect that Article 10(3) UNElectronic Commu-
nications Convention may have in the context of mobile communication,
it is furthermore important to note that the provision contains a firm rule
and not merely a presumption (15). Unlike other provisions in the UNElec-
tronic Communications Convention that use terms like “is presumed to
be” (as e.g. Articles 6(1) or 10(2)), thus creating a mere presumption that
may be rebutted by evidence to the contrary, Article 10(3) employs the
rather stricter term “is deemed to be”. It is clear from the travaux prépara-
toires that this wording was chosen deliberately in order to avoid attaching
any legal significance to the physical location of a server in a particular ju-
risdiction (16), thereby making Article 10(3) UN Electronic Communica-
tions Convention a “hard and fast” rule that applies without regard to the
circumstances of the particular case. As will be demonstrated below, it is
this character as a firm rule that may create difficulties when Article 10(3)
interacts with other rules of international contract law that refer to the
place of communication.
1.4. – The present paper will proceed as follows: The next section (2)
investigates to which extent current international contract law provides
rules that are suitable for the modern travelling merchants described
(13) D. Hettenbach, Das Übereinkommen der Vereinten Nationen über die Verwendung
elektronischer Mitteilungen bei internationalen Verträgen, Tübingen, 2008, p. 187.
(14) U.Magnus, in J. von Staudinger’s Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch mit Ein-
führungsgesetz und Nebengesetzen, Berlin, 2013, p. 84; P. Schlechtriem & U.G. Schroeter,
Internationales UN-Kaufrecht, 5th ed., Tübingen, 2013, para. 26; I. Schwenzer & P. Hachem,
in I. Schwenzer (ed.), Schlechtriem & Schwenzer Commentary on the UN Convention on the In-
ternational Sale of Goods (CISG), Oxford, 2010, p. 37.
(15) UNCITRAL Secretariat, Explanatory note, cit., para. 195;Hettenbach, op. cit., p.
195.
(16) UNCITRAL Secretariat, Explanatory note, cit., para. 195.
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above, before the following section (3) discusses the some of the remaining
legal difficulties caused by mobile communications. The final section (4)
briefly summarises and concludes.
2. – The hypothesis that the treatment of cross-border mobile commu-
nication can raise difficulties under traditional rules of law (17) rests fore-
most on the assumption that the place of communication has an important
role to play in legal contexts; an assumption that was accepted within
UNCITRAL. However, when the general statement that “the location of
the parties is important for issues such as jurisdiction, applicable law and
enforcement” (18) is put to the test, it becomes apparent that – at least in the
area of international contract law – it is mostly the usual party location (and
not the parties’ current location that is prone to change) which is the deci-
sive connection factor (see under 2.1.), and that factual local circumstances
at the moment of communication have similarly lost their importance un-
der rules of substantive international contract law (2.2). A related issue that
remains problematic is the treatment of so-called “virtual companies”
(2.3.).
2.1. – When referring to the location of a party to an international con-
tract, most contemporary instruments of international contract law indeed
refer to the party’s usual location, irrespective of its actual location (or that
of its legal representatives) at a specific point in time. The legal categories
employed for this purpose are mostly the “place of business” of a party
(used as a connecting factor inter alia in Article 1(1) UN Sales Convention,
in Article 1(1) UN Electronic Communications Convention and in numer-
ous other conventions) or its “habitual residence” (as used in Article 4(1),
(2) Regulation (EC) No. 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 7 June 2008 on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations
(hereinafter: EU Rome I Regulation) or, although merely subsidiarily, in
Article 10(b) UN Sales Convention).
For our present purpose, the decisive feature shared by places of busi-
ness and habitual residences is their non-transitory nature. Already under
ULIS, the German Supreme Court had held that the term “place of busi-
ness” – which neither ULIS nor the UN Sales Convention explicitly define
– refers to a “center of a party’s business activities from which it partici-
pates in commercial transactions” (19), and subsequent case law interpret-
(17) Under I 2.
(18) UNCITRAL Secretariat, Explanatory note, cit., para. 109.
(19) Bundesgerichtshof (BGH), in NJW, 1982, p. 2731.
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ing the UN Sales Convention stressed that a place of business presupposes
“a certain duration and stability” (20). It is therefore generally agreed that
neither having a hotel room or a rented office in a city nor engaging in sales
transactions on repeated occasions in a nation suffice (21). A further confir-
mation can be found in Article 4(h) UN Electronic Communications Con-
vention, which since 2005 has defined the term “place of business” as “any
place where a party maintains a non-transitory establishment to pursue an
economic activity other than the temporary provision of goods or services
out of a specific location”. Although the latter definition was only devel-
oped “for the purposes of this Convention”, it was an attempt to codify the
characteristics that had already previously been recognized under other in-
ternational conventions (22).
In the “m-commerce” context presently discussed, the widespread use
of the “place of business” concept deprives the location at which individual
mobile communications are conducted of much of its relevance, as only
the usual location of a party is used as a connecting factor. This tendency is
welcome as the usual party location is easier to identify and avoids giving
legal relevance to locations with which an electronic communication has a
merely fleeting connection (23). It furthermore accords with a modern
trend towards disregarding the place of contracting: As Professor Honnold
wrote, it was “the elusive and insubstantial nature of the place of contract-
ing @which# led UNCITRAL to delete provisions in Article 1(1) of ULIS
that made aspects of the making of the contract relevant in determining
whether a sale was international” (24).
2.2. – In addition, the drafters of more recently adopted uniform pri-
vate law conventions took increasingly care to avoid any legal significance
of local circumstances that exist at the moment of a party communication,
thereby further reducing any possible impact that the place of a mobile
communication may have.
This tendency became most obvious during the development of the
UN Sales Convention. Article 20(2) UN Sales Convention accordingly
contains this convention’s only explicit reference to local circumstances in
form of “official holidays or non-business days”, declaring that such days
(20) Schwenzer &Hachem, op. cit., p. 37.
(21) A. Rosett, Critical Reflections on the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods, in 43 Ohio State Law J., 1984, p. 279.
(22) UNCITRAL Secretariat, Explanatory note, cit., para. 105, Hettenbach, op. cit.,
pp. 78-79, 92.
(23) Hettenbach, op. cit., p. 196.
(24) Honnold, op. cit., p. 33.
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that occur during a period for acceptance fixed by the offeror in his offer
are generally to be included in calculating the period (which essentially
means that they are to be treated as any other day). Article 20(2) UN Sales
Convention thereby intentionally ignores the fact that parties in certain
countries may not be working on some of the days during the period for ac-
ceptance, based on the rationale that any other approach would create
problems in international transactions because official holidays or non-
business days differ from country to country and are accordingly difficult
to foresee for foreign parties (25). This rationale does not apply where holi-
days at the place of business of the offeror himself are concerned, as he
knows them better than the acceptor; accordingly, the second sentence of
Article 20(2) UN Sales Convention exceptionally takes those holidays into
account by extending the fixed period of acceptance (26). In the same spirit,
the legal definition of the “receipt” of party declarations contained in Ar-
ticle 24 UN Sales Convention has been interpreted without regard to the
recipient’s opportunity to gain awareness of the declaration under “usual
circumstances”, in contrary to some domestic laws where this factor plays
an important role (27). This interpretation has similarly been based on the
need to achieve an internationally uniformmeaning of the term, as Article
24 UN Sales Convention would otherwise be applied differently depend-
ing on the local customs and other circumstances in the recipient’s coun-
try (28).
Article 10 UN Electronic Communications Convention similarly
adopts the approach of the UN Sales Convention in the above-mentioned
regards (29). The accordingly very limited relevance of local circumstances
at the moment of communications under both conventions contributes to
their suitability for mobile communications, as the country where a decla-
ration is dispatched or received will not affect applicable substantive rules
of law.
2.3. – The prevailing use of the “place of business” concept implicitly
presupposes that every party to international business transactions pos-
sesses a brick-and-mortar establishment, because the necessary “duration
and stability” of a place of business as the “center of a party’s business ac-
(25) U.G. Schroeter, in I. Schwenzer (ed.), Schlechtriem & Schwenzer Commentary on
the UN Convention on the International Sale of Goods (CISG), Oxford, 2010, pp. 358-359.
(26) Schroeter, op. cit., p. 359.
(27) On German Law: K. Larenz & M. Wolf, Allgemeiner Teil des Bürgerlichen Rechts,
Munich, 2004, pp. 475-476.
(28) Magnus, op. cit., pp. 320-321; Schroeter, op. cit., p. 390.
(29) UNCITRAL Secretariat, Explanatory note, cit., para. 181.
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tivities from which it participates in commercial transactions” (30) requires
a permanent office of some sort. During the preparation of the UN Elec-
tronic Communications Convention, this preconception was challenged
when the treatment of “virtual companies” was discussed within UNC-
ITRAL (31): How should the UN Electronic Communications Convention
and its older, even more traditionally framed companion conventions deal
with legal entities which entirely or predominantly carry out their activities
through the use of information systems, without a fixed “establishment”
and without any connection to a physical location?
At the outset, it could well be doubted how relevant such purely “vir-
tual companies” are in practice (32). Nevertheless, they are not necessarily
an entirely theoretical concept: When thinking of a one-man trading com-
pany that is in the business of buying and reselling goods, it seems possible
that the process of identifying potential sellers and potential buyers as well
as concluding the necessary contracts with them may be conducted en-
tirely online. If it is furthermore part of the company’s business model to
never take actual delivery of the goods, but rather re-sell them before deliv-
ery is due and have any necessarily transportation, payments and other ser-
vices performed through third-party service providers, such a company
could well function “virtually”, e.g. without a brick-and-mortar establish-
ment or a physical back office.
In order to address virtual companies, the Working Group preparing
the UN Electronic Communications Convention opted for a solution that
at first appears as undecided yet open-minded, but turns out to be quite
conservative. On one hand, it concluded that it was not appropriate to in-
clude a provision on the presumption on the place of business of a virtual
company in the convention and that the matter at this early stage was bet-
ter left to the elaboration of emerging jurisprudence. On the other hand,
however, it confirmed that the place of business concept of the UN Elec-
tronic Communications Convention relied on a physical address rather
than a virtual one even where “virtual companies” are at stake (33). The lat-
ter decision had particularly important consequences because the lack of a
place of business in the traditional brick-and-mortar sense removes the ap-
(30) Schwenzer & Hachem, op. cit., p. 37.
(31) See in detailHettenbach, op. cit., p. 84.
(32) Hettenbach, op. cit., p. 93; but see U. Noack,Moderne Kommunikationsformen vor
den Toren des Unternehmensrechts, in ZHR, 1995, p. 592 at 615-616; P.P. Polanski, Internatio-
nal electronic contracting in the newest UNConvention, in 2 Journal of International Commercial
Law and Technology, 2007, p. 118: “one of the key elements of modern international electro-
nic commerce”.
(33) Polanski, op. cit., p. 114.
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plicability of the UNElectronic Communications Convention as such (and
that of other similarly structured conventions, too): If a “virtual” company
has no place of business, these conventions do not apply to its communica-
tions or contracts, as their applicability is limited to transactions conducted
between parties having their places of business in different States (34).
In legal writing, this solution has received much criticism (35). And in-
deed, it seems short sighted to entirely exclude virtual companies, as rare
as they may be, from the personal scope of many existing international
contract law instruments. When accordingly attempting a more liberal
construction of the “place of business” requirement in cases in which no
“click-and-mortar companies” (36) are concerned, a reliance on a “mobile”
place of business – i.e. the respective (changing) locations at which the vir-
tual companies’ individual business activities are conducted – would argu-
ably be incompatible with two of the principles on which Articles 4(h) and
6 UN Electronic Communications Convention are based, namely the fo-
cus on the non-transitory nature of a place of business and the possibility
to easily ascertain its location. In the case of virtual companies, it therefore
appears preferable to treat the company’s place of registration (if any) as its
place of business, given that the place of registration is usually non-transi-
tory. This solution is at the same time in accordance with the spirit of Ar-
ticle 6(1) UN Electronic Communications Convention which primarily
looks to the location indicated by a party in order to determine its place of
business: As an entity’s registration usually involves some kind of publicity
(e.g. through the publication of the company register’s content) (37), a com-
pany registration resembles an indirect indication of this location by the
registered party.
3. – Despite the general prevalence of mobility-friendly rules in cur-
rent international contract law, mobile communication by merchants still
raises certain legal difficulties. Among these, two main categories can be
identified: On one hand, the combination of means of communication
with a merely fleeting connection to geographical locations and legal rules
which continue to use the place of communication as a connecting factor
causes problems (see in more detail sections 3.3. and 3.4. below). On the
other hand, the attempted solution in Article 10(3) UN Electronic Com-
munications Convention in itself leads to unintended results when it inter-
(34) UNCITRAL Secretariat, Explanatory note, cit., para. 118.
(35) Hettenbach, op. cit., pp. 93-94.
(36) Polanski, op. cit., p. 114.
(37) Noack, op. cit., pp. 603-607.
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acts with certain other international contract law instruments, to be dis-
cussed in sections 3.1. and 3.2. below. As will be demonstrated, difficulties
of the latter type primarily arise when the UN Electronic Communications
Convention is applied to electronic communications in connection with
contracts to which “another” international convention, treaty or agreement
not specifically referred to in Article 20(1) UNElectronic Communications
Convention applies (as authorized by Article 20(2) of that convention), as
those “other” conventions interact less well with the UN Electronic Com-
munications Convention than the (mostly (38) UNCITRAL-made) conven-
tions listed in Article 20(1) UN Electronic Communications Convention.
3.1. – Among the conventions mentioned above, it is those creating
uniform private international law (conflict of laws) rules that result in diffi-
culties when applied together with Article 10(3) UN Electronic Communi-
cations Convention, while the latter provision’s interaction with conven-
tions containing substantive private law rules causes fewer problems. A
uniform private international law convention in point is the Hague Con-
vention of 15 June 1955 on the Law Applicable to International Sales of
Goods (hereinafter: Hague PIL Convention of 1955): Adopted decades be-
fore the first “modern” electronic means of communication was invented,
this rather dated convention continues to be a very important PIL instru-
ment in practice, given that it has been ratified by a number of European
States (Denmark, Finland, France, Italy, Norway, Sweden and Switzer-
land) along with a single African State (Niger) (39).
a) Article 3(2) Hague PIL Convention of 1955 and the Place of an Order’s
Receipt
Article 3(1) Hague PIL Convention of 1955 provides that a sale shall
generally be governed by the domestic law of the country in which the
seller has his habitual residence at the time when he receives the order – a
common rule that does not create any difficulties in the situations dis-
cussed here. However, Article 3(2) of the same Convention continues with
a more problematic exception that is widely regarded as being of signifi-
cant importance (40):
(38) The New York Convention of 10 June 1958 on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards listed in Article 20(1) UN Electronic Communications Convention
had been adopted before UNCITRAL was established in 1966.
(39) It should be noted that the Hague PIL Convention of 1955 continues to apply in the
EU Member States just mentioned despite the more recent adoption of the EU Rome I
Regulation (to be discussed in more detail further below), as Article 25(1) EU Rome I Regu-
lation grants prevalence to the Hague PIL Convention of 1955.
(40) M. Amstutz, N.P. Vogt &M. Wang, in H. Honsell, N.P. Vogt, A.K. Schnyder
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“Nevertheless, a sale shall be governed by the domestic law of the country in
which the buyer has his habitual residence, or in which he has the establishment
that has given the order, if the order has been received in such country, whether by
the seller or by his representative, agent or commercial traveller” (41).
Article 3(2) Hague PIL Convention of 1955 declares the buyer’s home
law to be the lex causae whenever the seller (or his representative, agent or
commercial traveller) is physically located in the buyer’s country at the
moment he receives the order. The relevant point in time for purposes of
this provision is not the conclusion of the contract (which may occur later,
e.g. when the seller’s declaration of acceptance reaches the buyer), but
rather the receipt of the order by the seller (42).
The situation that the drafters had in mind when creating Article 3(2)
Hague PIL Convention of 1955 was that of foreign seller entering the buy-
er’s country in an attempt to conclude contracts, i.e. by advertising its
goods through a local representative or by setting up a distribution system.
In such cases, the seller on its own initiative approaches the buyer in the
latter’s home country, and the buyer in turn does not even have to be
aware that the seller has his place of business in another country – indeed,
from the perspective of the buyer, a contract so initiated may appear en-
tirely like a local purchase. It was primarily this scenario that called for the
protection of the buyer’s expectation that the same (domestic) law will ap-
ply as in other domestic sales transactions (43).
b) Application to Mobile Receipts of Electronic Orders
The rationale behind Article 3(2) Hague PIL Convention of 1955 sug-
gests that the provision’s scope could have been limited to situations in
which the seller has more than a merely transitory presence in the buyer’s
country by appearing regularly in person, by setting up a permanent distri-
bution system or by showing some other behaviour that resembles that of
a local seller. The provision’s wording, however, contains no such restric-
tion, and it therefore equally applies to orders that are received by the seller
or his representative during a short-term sojourn in the buyer’s country, as
e.g. a change of airplanes at a local airport or a transit in form of an interna-
tional train ride. Due to the development of mobile communication, it for
& S.V. Berti (eds.), Basler Kommentar: Internationales Privatrecht, Basel, 2007, p. 883; M.
Keller & J. Kren Kostkiewicz, in A. Heini, M. Keller, K. Siehr, F. Vischer & P.
Volken (eds.), IPRG Kommentar, Zurich, 1993, p. 976.
(41) Non-official translation of the wording, as the Hague PIL Convention of 1955’s only
authentic text version is in French.
(42) Keller & Kostkiewicz, op. cit., p. 977.
(43) Amstutz, Vogt &Wang, op. cit., p. 883; Keller & Kostkiewicz, op. cit., p. 976.
SAGGI 33
the first time seems realistic that not only the dispatch of messages (which
was already possible previously, as e.g. through posting a letter at a foreign
train station), but also their receipt can occur during a largely accidental
presence in a country. If the receipt of an order happens under such cir-
cumstances, it affects the applicable law according to Article 3(2) Hague
PIL Convention of 1955, even though the concluded contract is likely to
have a much closer connection to the seller’s home country.
(With good reason, the successor provision in the more recently
adopted Article 8(2)(a) Hague PIL Convention of 1986 was framed sub-
stantially more narrowly by requiring that “negotiations were conducted,
and the contract concluded by and in the presence of the parties” in the
buyer’s State, meaning that both the negotiations and conclusion of the
contract must have taken place in the State where the buyer has his princi-
pal place of business (44)).
c) Effect of Article 10(3) UN Electronic Communications Convention
The legal situation is yet different, however, where Article 10(3) UN
Electronic Communications Convention applies. As this provision de-
clares that all electronic communications are deemed to be received at
the place where their addressee has its place of business, its interaction
with Article 3(2) Hague PIL Convention of 1955 deprives the latter con-
flict of laws rule of its entire scope whenever an electronic order reaches
the seller in the buyer’s country: All such orders are deemed to be re-
ceived at the seller’s place of business, thereby indiscriminately trigger-
ing the application of the seller’s home law in accordance with Article 3(1)
Hague PIL Convention of 1955. In this context, it is important to note
that this effect is not limited to cases of a merely fleeting presence of
the seller in the buyer’s country – it applies all the same to situations in
which the seller has a permanent local presence that fails to reach the
threshold of a “place of business”. While Article 3(2) Hague PIL Con-
vention of 1955 may be framed too broadly, the same criticism therefore
applies to Article 10(3) UN Electronic Communications Convention
which does not distinguish between communications with or without a
factual connection to their place of actual receipt. The two provisions’
interaction effectively strikes out Article 3(2) Hague PIL Convention of
1955 for purposes of electronic commerce, thereby surprisingly eliminat-
ing a long established conflicts of law rule.
(44) A.T. von Mehren, Convention on the law applicable to contracts for the international
sale of goods. Text adopted by the Diplomatic Conference of October 1985, in Explanatory Re-
port, Hague Conference on Private International Law, The Hague, 1987, p. 29.
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3.2. – The formal validity of contracts and other juridical acts has tradi-
tionally been determined in accordance with the rule locus regit actum, a
principle that has been universally recognized since the Middle Ages (45).
The conflict of laws with respect to the form of contracts is therefore an-
other area in which the place of communication continues to play a crucial
role, thereby opening a further field for unfortunate interaction with Ar-
ticle 10(3) UN Electronic Communications Convention.
a) Favor Validitatis Through Alternative Connecting Factors
In this context, it is important to note that most current international
private law rules about the formal validity of contracts share one character-
istic, in that they all provide for alternative references to various connect-
ing factors. An example can be found in Article 11(2) EU Rome I Regula-
tion, which reads:
“A contract concluded between persons who, or whose agents, are in differ-
ent countries at the time of its conclusion is formally valid if it satisfies the formal
requirements of the law which governs it in substance under this Regulation, or of
the law of either of the countries where either of the parties or their agent is
present at the time of conclusion, or of the law of the country where either of the
parties had his habitual residence at that time”.
Article 11(2) EU Rome I Regulation therefore treats a contract as for-
mally valid if it meets the form requirements of at least one among poten-
tially five different laws: In case of e.g. a contract of sale, either (1) the law
governing the sales contract according to Articles 3 and 4 EU Rome I
Regulation (the lex causae) or (2) the law of the country where the buyer or
its agent is present at the time of contract conclusion or (3) the law of the
country where the seller or its agent is present at that time or (4) the law of
the country where the buyer had his habitual residence at that time or fi-
nally (5) the law of the country where the seller had his habitual residence
at that time equally suffices. If the contract is valid under merely one of
these laws, that is enough to prevent defects of form under any other law
from affording grounds for nullity (46).
Similar provisions, albeit with less complicated wordings, can also be
found in Article 11(2), (3) Hague PIL Convention of 1986 and in Article
13(2) Inter-American Convention of 17March 1994 on the Law Applicable
(45) A.V. Dicey, J.H.C. Morris & L. Collins, The Conflicts of Laws, 15th ed., London,
2012, para. 32-128.
(46) M. Giuliano & P. Lagarde, Report on the Convention on the law applicable to con-
tractual obligations, in Official Journal of the European Communities, 31 October 1980, No. C
282, p. 30.
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to International Contracts (hereinafter: Mexico Convention), as well as in
numerous domestic laws.
The use of alternative references to various laws in the above-cited
provisions has always the same purpose, namely to reduce significantly the
possibility of successfully challenging sales contracts for formal defects (47).
This regulatory approach is based on the related principles favor negotii and
favor validitatis which both aim at avoiding the formal invalidity of con-
tracts as far as possible (48), thereby giving preference to the enforcement of
party agreements over the competing interest that form requirements are
trying to protect.
b) Application to Mobile Receipts of Electronic Acceptances in Third
Countries
The private international law rules cited above are in conformity in
that they refer to the lex causae and the lex loci actus, although they vary
with respect to the further alternative references they make. Their refer-
ences to the lex loci actus differ in their wording, but not in their content:
Article 11(2) EU Rome I Regulation speaks rather clearly of “the law of ei-
ther of the countries where either of the parties or their agent is present at
the time of conclusion”, whereas the wording of Article 11(2) Hague PIL
Convention of 1986 – “@a# contract of sale concluded between persons who
are in different States is formally valid if it satisfies the requirements @...# of
the law of one of those States” – could at first sight raise doubts whether
the States in which persons “are” are the States where their respective place
of business or habitual residence is located, or the States in which one of
the parties is present at the time of the contract’s conclusion. The explana-
tory report to the Hague PIL Convention of 1986 clarifies that the latter
meaning was intended (49), making it a reference to the lex loci actus. Ar-
ticle 13(2) Mexico Convention arguably means the same when it refers to
the form requirements “of the law of one of the States in which @the con-
tract# is concluded”.
The presence of a party in a certain country which the above PIL provi-
sions refer to does not need to be permanent. Amerely transitory presence
suffices (50), including that of a party who happens to be travelling through
(47) VonMehren, op. cit., p. 39.
(48) L. Loacker, in G.-P. Calliess (ed.), Rome Regulations: Commentary on the Euro-
pean Rules of the Conflict of Laws, Alphen aan den Rijn, 2011, pp. 222-223; T. Pfeiffer, M.
Weller & C.F. Nordmeier, in G. Spindler & F. Schuster (eds.), Recht der elektronischen
Medien- Kommentar, Munich, 2011, Artikel 11 Rom I para. 1.
(49) VonMehren, op. cit., p. 39.
(50) Pfeiffer, Weller & Nordmeier, op. cit., para. 4.
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a country at the relevant point in time (51). This interpretation seems par-
ticularly obvious in case of Article 11(2) EURome I Regulation, as this pro-
vision mentions the parties’ habitual (and therefore permanent) residence
as an alternative connecting factor, but the same was already recognized
under the predecessor provision in Article 9(2) Rome Convention of 19
June 1980 on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations (52) which did
not yet contain this alternative reference. It is similarly the prevailing view
under Article 11(2) Hague PIL Convention of 1986 (53). In the context of
mobile communications, this means that also the law of a place where a
travelling businessman sends and receives e-mails while changing air-
planes at some foreign airport constitutes a suitable lex loci actus that may
govern the formal validity of a contract formed through such an e-mail.
The fact that such a place may seem random and lacking any connection to
the contract does not affect this result (54). Within the framework of PIL
rules serving the favor validitatis principle, it effectively contributes to
achieving the formal validity of contracts, because seemingly random
places of communication are particularly likely to invoke laws other than
the laws invoked by the alternative connecting factors.
Article 10(3) UN Electronic Communications Convention in turn pro-
duces the contrary effect when applied in connection with such PIL rules:
By providing that electronic communications are deemed to be dispatched
at the originator’s and received at the addressee’s place of business, Arti-
cle 10(3) UN Electronic Communications Convention effectively strikes
out any PIL reference to places of communication. In doing so, it reduces
the effectiveness of favor validitatis; a result that presumably was neither
foreseen nor desired by the drafters of the UNElectronic Communications
Convention. This result is particularly unfortunate because the suitability
for electronically concluded contracts had been an important concern
when the wording of Article 11(2) EU Rome I Regulation was adopted:
“Given the growing frequency of distance contracts, the rules in the
@Rome# Convention @of 1980, predecessor to the EU Rome I Regulation#
governing formal validity of contracts are now clearly too restrictive. To fa-
cilitate the formal validity of contracts or unilateral acts, further alternative
connecting factors @namely the parties’ habitual residence# are intro-
(51) P. Winkler von Mohrenfels, in J. von Staudinger’s Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen
Gesetzbuch mit Einführungsgesetz und Nebengesetzen, Berlin, 2011, Artikel 11 Rom I-VO para.
81.
(52) Giuliano & Lagarde, op. cit., pp. 30-31.
(53) von Mehren, op. cit., p. 39.
(54) Pfeiffer, Weller & Nordmeier, op. cit., para 4.
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duced” (55). That Article 10(3) UN Electronic Communications Conven-
tion partially undermines that goal could therefore well work as a deterrent
when the Convention’s ratification by the European Union and/or its
member states is being considered.
3.3. – A third group of legal difficulties potentially triggered by the use
of mobile communications is unconnected to Article 10(3) UN Electronic
Communications Convention, but rather arises due to legal rules which
continue to give relevance to the place where a declaration is made.
a) Place of Communication in the Conflict of Laws
This is first and foremost true under a number of domestic conflict of
laws regimes: Despite the tendency in recent years to regard the place of
contracting as less and less decisive (56), the lex loci actus and the lex loci
contractus have retained their general importance in some countries. One
prominent example is the private international law of Brazil, where con-
tractual obligations continue to be governed by the law of the place of con-
tracting according to Article 9 of the Introductory Law to the Brazilian
Civil Code. Another example are conflict of laws rules in the United States,
although today only a minority among the States within the U.S. still fol-
low the lex loci contractus rule (57).
Even under conflict of laws regimes that still look to the place of con-
tracting, the particularities of mobile communication may be accommo-
dated by way of a reasonable interpretation of the lex loci contractus rule. In
this spirit, the U.S.-American Restatement (Second) on the Conflict of
Laws already in 1971 recognized that the place of contracting may only
have a limited importance in certain circumstances: “By way of contrast,
the place of contracting will have little significance, if any, when it is purely
fortuitous and bears no relation to the parties and the contract, such as
when a letter of acceptance is mailed in a railroad station in the course of
an interstate trip” (58). This example used for illustration in 1971 is arguably
comparable to today’s sending of an acceptance via e-mail while the sender
is changing airplanes in some airport, thereby indicating that the place of
such an electronic communication would similarly be regarded as having
(55) European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and
the Council on the law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I) (presented by the Commis-
sion), COM(2005) 650 final, Brussels, p. 8.
(56) Hay, Lando & Rotunda, op. cit., p. 240.
(57) P. Hay, P.J. Borchers & S.C. Symeonides, Conflict of Laws, 5th ed., St. Paul 2010,
pp. 1171-1172.
(58) Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws, American Law Institute, 1971, § 188 com-
ment (e).
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an insignificant relationship to the transaction and the parties under the
principles of U.S. conflict of laws.
b) Factual Circumstances at the Moment of Communication in Contract
Law
In addition, domestic contract laws are often less attuned to cross-bor-
der mobile communications than the uniform substantive law conventions
addressed above: (59) As domestic laws have typically developed as rules
for transactions conducted within the nation, theymore frequently operate
with terms like “the usual circumstances” or “typically” (60) which implic-
itly assume that these “usual” circumstances are those found in the respec-
tive nation, familiar to its domestic courts. Such substantive law standards
operate less well when being applied to mobile communications sent or re-
ceived in a different country under different factual circumstances. Again,
a reasonable application of such domestic laws to “foreign” communica-
tions may help to avoid unsuitable results.
3.4. – a) The Dilemma
Finally, a well-known general characteristic of the internet – its ano-
nymity – can create particular problems in the context of mobile communi-
cations, as it may cause uncertainty about a communicating party’s loca-
tion (61). The reason is that an e-mail indicates the e-mail account from
which it was sent, but neither the location of the server on which it is stored
(which is in any way declared irrelevant for legal purposes by Article 6(4)(a)
UN Electronic Communications Convention) nor the current location of
the sending party or its place of business. Whenever one of these locations
is used as a connecting factor in legal rules, the recipient of an electronic
message may accordingly be unaware of the result of their application in
the particular case (62).
b) UN Electronic Communications Convention: An Attempted (but
Failed) Explicit Solution
This uncertainty was recognized during the preparation of the UN
Electronic Communications Convention. In reaction, the Working Group
within UNCITRAL considered at length proposals that contemplated a
duty for the parties to disclose their places of business, among other infor-
(59) See II 2.
(60) H.P.Mansel, in O. Jauernig (ed.), Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch, 15th ed., Munich, 2014,
§ 130 BGB para. 4.
(61) Eiselen, op. cit., p. 131.
(62) K.W. Chong & J.S. Chao, United Nations Convention on the Use of Electronic Com-
munications in International Contracts – A New Global Standard, in 18 Singapore Academy Law
J., 2006, p. 133.
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mation. However, the consensus that eventually emerged was that any
duty of that kind would be ill-fitted to a commercial law instrument and
potentially harmful to certain existing business practices. It was felt that
such disclosure obligations were typically found in legislation primarily
concerned with consumer protection. In any event, to be effective, the op-
eration of regulatory provisions of that type needed to be supported by a
number of administrative and other measures that could not be provided
in the convention. It was regarded as particularly troublesome that the con-
sequences that might flow from failure by a party to comply with such dis-
closure obligations remained unclear (63).
Against this background, the elaborations within UNCITRAL merely
lead to the adoption of Article 7 UN Electronic Communications Conven-
tion which reminds the parties of the need to comply with possible obliga-
tions to disclose their place of business that might exist under any other
rule of law, but does not impose such a disclosure duty in itself. In addi-
tion, the drafters also viewedArticle 10(3) UNElectronic Communications
Convention as a contribution to solving the uncertainty dilemma, given
that one of its purposes is to ensure that the place of receipt of a communi-
cation “can be readily ascertained by the originator” of the message (64).
This view is reflective of the primary rationale behind this provision men-
tioned above, namely to prevent the location of an information system
from becoming a decisive element in legal contexts. The discernibility of
the decisive place of business, however, is neither addressed in Article 10(3)
nor in Article 6 UN Electronic Communications Convention (to which the
earlier provision refers), thereby leaving this aspect of the uncertainty issue
unresolved.
c) Other Instruments of International Contract Law: Discernibility of
Other Party’s Location Not Required
Upon closer scrutiny, it becomes apparent that many other instru-
ments of international contract law similarly fail to secure the discernibility
of a party’s location, despite the fact that they rely on this place for their ap-
plicability and application. This is true both with respect to international
contract law rules that refer to a party’s usual location, notably its place of
business (see under aa)) and rules of law that refer to a party’s current loca-
tion at the moment of communication (see under bb)):
aa) Uncertainty about the Other Party’s Place of Business
An example for the first type of international law instrument is (again)
the UN Sales Convention, which in Article 1(1)(a) makes its applicability
(63) UNCITRAL Secretariat, Explanatory note, cit., para. 122-125.
(64) UNCITRAL Secretariat, Explanatory note, cit., para. 194.
40 CONTRATTO E IMPRESA / EUROPA 1-2015
dependent on both contracting parties having their place of business in dif-
ferent Contracting States. Article 1(2) UN Sales Convention goes on to re-
quire that the fact that the parties have their places of business in different
States must not be indiscernible for the parties (65), thereby preventing the
Convention’s application to contracts whose international character was
not known or contemplated by both parties at the moment of contract con-
clusion (and that therefore looked like a purely domestic transaction to at
least one of them). However, Article 1(2) UN Sales Convention does not
require an indication of the particular State the other party is residing
in (66), letting it suffice that its place of business in some other country is
sufficiently apparent. (Interestingly, Article 10(a) UN Sales Convention
specifies that “if a party has more than one place of business, the place of
business is that which has the closest relationship to the contract and its
performance, having regard to the circumstances known to or contemplated
by the parties at any time before or at the conclusion of the contract” (67): For
the less-than-common situation of a party with multiple places of business,
the UN Sales Convention therefore makes reference to the parties’ aware-
ness about the location of the decisive place of business, but it fails to do
the same in the much more frequent cases of parties with a single place of
business, which lie outside of Article 10(a) UN Sales Convention’s scope).
In the context of contracts concluded via electronic means (e.g. an ex-
change of e-mails between parties that have not had business relations be-
fore), the UN Sales Convention as well as the numerous other conventions
with a similar sphere of applicability (68) therefore leave ample room for
uncertainty: While the use of an e-mail address with a foreign TLD may
alert the other party to the international character of the proposed transac-
tion and therefore supposedly suffices for purpose of Article 1(2) UN Sales
Convention (69), a national TLD (“.it”, “.za”, “.fr”, “.co.uk”) that is part of
an e-mail address alone provides no reliable indication that the respective
user’s place of business is located in that country, as Article 6(5) UN Elec-
tronic Communications Convention makes explicitly clear.
From a practical perspective, this can lead to surprises because reserva-
(65) This somewhat awkward negative wording is justified by the burden of proof: Under
Article 1(2) UN Sales Convention, it is the party relying on the fact that the internationality of
the contract was not apparent who has to prove this fact (Schwenzer & Hachem, op. cit., p.
44).
(66) Schwenzer & Hachem, op. cit., p. 46.
(67) Emphasis added. Note that a similar provision can be found in Article 6(2) UN Elec-
tronic Communications Convention.
(68) See 1.1 a) above.
(69) Magnus, op. cit., p. 87; Schwenzer &Hachem, op. cit., p. 45.
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tions made by certain UN Sales Convention Contracting States in accor-
dance with Articles 92-96 UN Sales Convention may influence the content
of uniform law as applied to the particular contract: It is therefore e.g. pos-
sible that a buyer only finds out after the contract’s conclusion that he has
placed his electronic order with a seller that has his place of business in a
State which has made a reservation under Article 96 UN Sales Convention,
and that the contract is therefore subject to domestic form require-
ments (70).
bb) Uncertainty about the Other Party’s Current Location
Finally, the predictable uncertainty about a party’s current location re-
mains similarly unaddressed by legal rules referring to this location: Nei-
ther Article 3(1) Hague PIL Convention of 1955 with its reliance on the
place where the seller has received the buyer’s order nor Article 11(2) EU
Rome I Regulation, Article 11(2) Hague PIL Convention of 1986 and
Article 13(2)Mexico Convention with their references to the place of action
require that the other party must have known or been in a position to be
aware of that location (71). The result of this silence is that the above-men-
tioned references to the lex loci actus operate even if a party makes at state-
ment via e-mail while in a different country than expected by the other
party in light of the prior negotiations (72) – a situation particularly likely to
occur whenmobile means of communications are used, which may lead to
surprising legal results at odds with the aim of legal certainty.
4. – The development of “mobile” means of communication raises a
number of new questions under the existing rules of international contract
law. Most of the difficulties in this context arise due to the cross-border
mobility of today’s merchants who can dispatch and receive communica-
tions relating to their international contracts at virtually any place through-
out the world, thereby potentially triggering the applicability of local laws
in accordance with traditionally conflict of laws principles like locus regit
actum.
The present article has tried to take stock of the legal difficulties raised
by increasing use of mobile communications and found that many poten-
tial difficulties are avoided through the prevalence of mobility-friendly
rules in current international contract law (73). Among those that re-
(70) Schlechtriem & Schroeter, op. cit., para. 26.
(71) On Article 11(2) EU Rome I Regulation see Pfeiffer, Weller & Nordmeier, op.
cit., para. 6.
(72) Loacker, op. cit., p. 240.
(73) See above 2.
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main (74), a number of intricate problems are surprisingly triggered by a
provision that was designed to be a solution to such difficulties, namely
Article 10(3) UN Electronic Communications Convention. Its interaction
with rules of private international law in some international uniform law
instruments raises doubts as to its suitability for this purpose.
A final criticism that has been directed at Article 10(3) UN Electronic
Communications Convention is its alleged lack of technological neutrality,
as the provision creates special rules for electronic communications which
do not exist for conventional means of communication (75). It is submitted
that this critique is unjustified, as the principle of technological neutrality,
while being recognized as one of the principles underlying the conven-
tion (76), should not be construed to exclude any distinction between dif-
ferent forms of communication, but only those distinctions which do not
reflect factual differences. In this respect, mobile communication as an in-
creasingly important subset of electronic communication possesses factual
features that warrant special legal rules, although Article 10(3) UN Elec-
tronic Communications Convention may not be the final word in this mat-
ter.
(74) See 3.
(75) Chong & Chao, op. cit., p. 133;Hettenbach, op. cit., pp. 196-197.
(76) Eiselen, op. cit., pp. 124-127.
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